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1 Introduction 
The urban population of the developing world is projected to increase by some two 
billion in the next 30 years. Urbanization rates are strongly correlated with per capita 
income, productivity tends to be high in cities, and urban job creation is an important 
driver of economic growth. But urbanization is also one aspect of the widening spatial 
disparities that often accompany economic development, and many countries have 
urban structures dominated by their prime city. While cities are highly productive, they 
create heavy demands for investments in infrastructure and accommodation, in the 
absence of which slums and informal settlements develop. Urbanization gives rise to 
numerous policy challenges, both to make cities work better and to ensure that the 
overall city structure (the number and size distribution of cities) is as efficient as 
possible. There is no presumption that an unregulated free market pattern of urban 
development is socially efficient (even when conditional upon appropriate levels of 
public investment). Urban activity creates many externalities, both positive and 
negative, so economic theory tells us that an unregulated outcome will not achieve 
efficiency. We observe the grim conditions of developing mega-cities, and we know 
that, in some developing countries, the primate city takes a far larger share of population 
than was the case in much of the developed world at similar stages of development 
(Bairoch 1988). The performance of the urban sector also bears on overall economic 
growth. Much job creation – in modern sector activities and in the informal sector – 
takes place in cities. What determines the attractiveness of a location as a host for 
investment, and how can city environments be developed to maximize job creation? Do 
‘bad’ city structures impede overall growth? 
These concerns point to the need to have a robust understanding of the economics of 
cities, both theoretically and empirically. Unfortunately, we are far from having such an 
understanding. Work in development economics over the last several decades has been 
largely silent on the issue. Some aspects of urbanization have been approached in the 
contexts of migration and industrial development, but have rarely focused on the 
particularly urban issues that arise. Urban economics is, however, experiencing a 
renaissance in the academic literature.
1 There has been improvement in theoretical 
methods as economic analysis becomes better at analysing economies of scale, and 
there have been empirical advances as larger datasets and better econometric tools are 
applied. Some of this work has been applied to developing countries (most notably by 
Vernon Henderson from Brown University), although the developing country literature 
remains thin. 
The objective of this paper is to draw out messages from this literature in order to 
understand several issues. The first issue is that of the benefits and the costs of cities. 
Per capita income and productivity are generally higher in cities than elsewhere, partly 
because of productivity benefits of cities, and partly because of political access and rent 
seeking. At the same time, urban living is constrained by the availability of land, and 
brings congestion and pollution costs. How do these costs and benefits depend on urban 
scale, and how does urban governance shape them? This question is the starting point 
                                                 
1  See, for example, the new Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics (Henderson and Thisse 
2004). However, not one of the 20 chapters in this volume deals with developing country issues.   2
for any discussion of cities in development, and this paper offers a brief survey of the 
literature. 
The second issue we address is that of the determinants of urban structure. What 
determines the size distribution of cities, how do these evolve through time, and what 
are the arguments for policy intervention? One aspect of this is to do with the effect of 
openness to trade, both international and within country. There is a view that 
globalization is encouraging the move to large cities, and we develop a theoretical 
model that explores and confirms this conjecture. The other concerns the extent to 
which the market failures associated with urban development bias the shape of the 
urban system. Cities are riddled with market and governance failures that cause 
inefficiencies within cities, distort the city structure, and possibly also reduce the returns 
to job creation, impeding overall growth. There is likely to be a tendency for cities to be 
too large and for there to be too few of them, and an argument that policy should 
remove obstacles to decentralization. We review and discuss these arguments. 
We organize the material by first looking at the literature on costs and benefits of cities. 
We then turn to issues of trade and urban structure, and subsequently cover market 
failures and urban policy in the final section.  
2  Urban economics: theory  
Two broad theses are offered to explain urbanization in developing countries and, in 
particular, the role of the primate city. The first, which we will refer to as ‘productivity’, 
is that there are efficiency gains associated with clustering activity; firms and workers 
are attracted by these benefits. The second, which we will refer to as ‘rent seeking’, is 
that city dwellers are better able to extract rents because of preferential access to the 
political system. These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; both operate to varying 
degrees in different countries and cities. Pulling in the opposite direction, there are costs 
associated with urban centres – including transport and infrastructure costs, and 
externalities associated with congestion and pollution. 
2.1 Productivity 
There are some functions, such as government and central administration, that are 
inherently urban – or at least appear so in virtually all historical contexts. Other 
activities, such as distribution (markets, exchange, wholesale, and retail activities), other 
services and manufacturing can operate either in a city or in smaller towns or villages. 
What determines the benefits of grouping such activities in an urban centre?
2 
The first argument derives from ‘thick’ goods markets. A system of exchange works 
better if it operates at a reasonable scale. The variety of goods on offer is greater, search 
and travel costs are reduced, and competition is more intense. Unsurprisingly then, 
‘market towns’ develop in order to provide locations for trade. Often, these centres are 
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home to local agricultural markets and so have important linkages with the surrounding 
rural economy.
3 
The second urban advantage derives from ‘market access’. Suppose that a 
manufacturing (or service) activity faces transport costs on the goods that it sells. Other 
things being equal, the most profitable location for such a firm is close to a large mass 
of consumers – that is, in an urban centre. Models predict an amplification effect, so that 
manufacturing is drawn towards locations with good market access and, in turn, the jobs 
and consumer expenditure created mean a large market. Physical geography and 
transport systems also come into play here; a port or river crossing will have better 
market access than a mountaintop. These arguments extend to forward and backward 
linkages, perhaps better labelled as ‘cost’ and ‘demand’ linkages.
4 Many firms are 
primarily engaged in supplying other firms (rather than final consumers) and, for such 
firms, good market access means proximity to customer firms. This is the backward or 
demand linkage – firms want to locate close to the sources of demand for their output. 
But the converse of any backward linkage is a forward or cost linkage. Firms that 
purchase the output of other firms will want to locate close to their supplier firms. The 
combined effect of these demand and cost linkages can create a powerful force for 
agglomeration of activity. We see it in dense networks of firms in related industries – 
engineering, electronics, and even financial services – where firms that supply specialist 
financial skills locate near the big financial institutions, and these institutions benefit 
from access to the skills of the specialists. A developing country example is the surgical 
instruments cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan, where Nadvi (1999) identifies ‘over 20 stages in 
production, each requiring distinct skills and tools. Surgical instrument making thus 
lends itself to an extensive division of labour and the process of large numbers of 
subcontractors in most process activities’ (Nadvi 1999: 87). 
Several other arguments also point to productivity benefits of cities. Thick market 
effects arise in the context of labour markets. Large pools of specialist workers and 
firms using these skills benefit from the better matching of skills with requirements, and 
also from risk sharing if there are firm- or worker-specific fluctuations in demand or 
supply. Incentives to acquire skills are greater if several firms are seeking those skills; 
the worker is then less likely to be subject to the power of a single employer 
(monopsony). Labour turnover is one – but not the only – mechanism through which 
firms in a dense cluster of activity can benefit from the skills and knowledge of other 
firms. There is considerable evidence of productivity spillovers between firms, as they 
are able to learn about and imitate the practices of other firms in the industry. Silicon 
Valley provides an example where knowledge exchange – formal and informal – is 
widespread. The knowledge might be about production methods, marketing skills, or 
simply knowledge about the location itself. Thus, multinational firms tend to cluster in 
particular locations, partly because one firm, observing the success (or failure) of 
another, learns about the quality of the business environment in the location. Hausmann 
and Rodrik (2002) argue that very narrow patterns of specialization in developing 
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regional and urban development, are beyond the scope of this paper: they are discussed in depth by 
Tacoli (2004). 
4  For a formal analysis, see Fujita et al. (1999). An older tradition of development economics 
considered these linkages, although without recognizing the role of increasing returns to scale and 
associated market failures.   4
countries (for example, specialization in soccer ball production) arise as producers learn 
about the efficiency of a particular location for producing a particular good, this then 
becoming public knowledge. 
The final argument is to do with the provision of public goods. Public goods are 
inherently associated with increasing returns to scale, since the opportunity cost of 
consuming them is zero. It therefore makes sense to locate them where demand is high 
and where any network effects can be maximized. Thus, if a country is to build 100 
kilometres of paved road, it is efficient to build most of it joined up rather than scattered 
around. In this case, an ‘urban bias’ in public expenditure and provision is an efficient 
allocation of resources (Arnott and Gersovitz 1986). 
These are distinct arguments, but all share several characteristics. First, they are sources 
of spatially concentrated increasing returns to scale; there are efficiency gains from 
having things located in the same place. Second, all these arguments are potential 
drivers of cumulative causation. People choose to set up activities in a location not 
because of the intrinsic merit of the location, but because other people have already 
done so, or are expected to. Put differently, there are positive reciprocal externalities; 
my presence makes the city more attractive to you, your presence makes it more 
attractive to me, and so on. Furthermore, these mechanisms create ‘lock-in’ or ‘path-
dependent’ development. A city might be in the wrong place, or an industry in the 
wrong city – but once there, it will not be profitable for any single producer to move 
away from the cluster. 
Before leaving the issue of the productivity benefits of cities, we should note two 
further issues. One is that the productivity benefits might have quite different sectoral 
ranges. Some operate within quite narrow sectors of activity, so do not require large 
cities to accommodate them, while others (e.g. to do with the operation of the labour 
market) cut across sectors and are city wide. We return to this distinction between 
‘localization’ and ‘urbanization’ in the empirical section. The other is that cities can 
have dynamic effects over and above the static effects on which we have focused here. 
These dynamic effects will depend on the role that urban environments play in 
developing new products and processes. Duranton and Puga (2001) argue that large 
diverse metropolitan areas play a role as a ‘nursery’. These information-rich 
environments allow firms to develop new products and processes. However, once 
production becomes standardized, firms move out to cheaper specialized locations 
where they can benefit from localization economies without the high costs of the large 
urban city. Duranton and Puga (2001) provide evidence on firms across French 
metropolitan areas that appear to be consistent with their theory. Could large diverse 
metropolitan areas be playing a similar role in developing countries? Clearly, the kind 
of R&D and innovation undertaken by developing country entrepreneurs differs from 
the way these terms are commonly used in the developed country context. Nevertheless, 
entrepreneurs in low-income countries must also engage in a process of innovation and 
learning. Their focus is on what Rodrik (2004: 9) calls ‘cost discovery’: ‘What is 
involved is not coming up with new products or processes, but discovering that a certain 
good, already well established in world markets, can be produced at home at low cost’. 
Rodrik suggests some developing country examples: cut flowers in Colombia, t-shirts in 
Bangladesh, soccer balls in Pakistan, and software in India. The urban nature of these 
cost discovery processes remains largely unexplored. However, Hausmann and Rodrik’s 
(2002) emphasis on the importance of tacit knowledge in the self-discovery process 
suggests that, just as for their developed country counterparts, this process of cost   5
discovery will be easier in the information rich environment of large diverse urban 
areas.  
2.2 Rent  seeking 
The arguments discussed turned on real efficiency gains from the scale effects of urban 
centres. Other arguments are based on the idea that urban–rural differentials are due to 
transfer payments – urban dwellers benefit not by creating resources, but by extracting 
them from the rest of society. These arguments have been developed by a number of 
researchers, including Lipton’s view of ‘urban bias’ (Lipton 1976, 1993) and Hoselitz’s 
‘parasitic city’ (Nash 1977). 
The main mechanism is political access. In many developing countries, starting a 
business, hiring and firing workers, registering property, enforcing contracts, getting 
credit, protecting investors, and closing a business are subject to extensive regulation 
(World Bank 2005). The probability of getting permits and licences could be enhanced 
by proximity to the administrative centre. Furthermore, the political power of an urban 
proletariat might mean that the government acts to raise their real incomes. This will 
attract workers to the town, although its effect on employment is ambiguous; food 
subsidies might reduce the wages that firms need to pay, creating jobs, while minimum 
wage legislation will have the opposite effect. 
The urban bias argument is also made in terms of overall patterns of import protection 
and relative prices. Import substituting governments have typically raised the prices of 
manufactures relative to agricultural goods, and this is sometimes argued to be a source 
of urban bias. For present purposes, however, it is important to keep separate the 
question of what is produced and where it is produced. Supporting manufactures is 
supporting cities only if – for some other reason – manufactures are produced in cities. 
2.3  Urban costs  
The forces outlined in the previous section were to do with cities creating income 
(productivity effects) or transferring it (rent seeking). However, cities also destroy 
income – they create costs for urban dwellers. 
A concentrated urban structure, particularly one that has a high degree of city 
specialization, involves large volumes of trade between cities and, hence, incurs high 
transport costs. This cost is internalized by firms but is nevertheless a cost of urban 
concentration to be placed against the benefits of economies scale. Within the city, large 
urban areas incur high costs of travel and commuting. A standard urban economics 
model assumes that jobs are clustered in one (or several) ‘central business districts’ to 
which workers have to commute. This, in turn, generates a land rent gradient; rents are 
high in the centre where commuting costs are low, and low on the edge where 
commuting costs are high. Commuting costs are the resource and time costs of running 
and using an urban transport system, and can be amplified by congestion costs. 
Conceptually, the costs outlined in the preceding paragraph are of three quite distinct 
types. The first is the direct cost of trade between cities or uncongested commuting 
within a city; a resource cost, but one that is not necessarily associated with any sort of 
market failure. The second is the cost of paying urban rents. This is a transfer payment,   6
not a resource cost; it is paid by urban dwellers to urban landowners. The third is the 
addition to commuting costs created by congestion, a negative reciprocal externality 
between those travelling within the city. Of course, this is not the only negative 
externality associated with urban areas. Others include air and water pollution and, in 
some places, costs of crime and urban violence.  
A further source of cost that has been the subject of much attention in the development 
literature is that a city might attract a number of workers who are either un- or under-
employed. The economics underlying this dual labour market structure are illuminated 
by the Harris–Todaro model. The model supposes that the urban real wage is above real 
earnings in agriculture. This might be because of institutional rigidities supporting a 
high urban wage (minimum wage legislation, union power or price support), or for 
efficiency wage reasons (wage reductions are unprofitable, as they reduce the quality of 
labour through nutritional, effort, or selection effects). The high urban wage attracts 
labour to the city in search of these ‘formal sector’ jobs. Given the number of such jobs, 
equilibrium migration is attained when the probability of a migrant getting a job is low 
enough that the expected wage from migration equals earnings in agriculture. Migrants 
who fail to obtain a formal sector job are unemployed, or work for a much lower wage 
in the urban ‘informal sector’.
5 The strength of the Harris–Todaro model is its 
simplicity, but this comes at the cost of abstracting from many important aspects of the 
problem. The dual structure of formal and informal urban labour markets is complex, 
and rural–urban migration occurs for many reasons. Nevertheless, the model makes the 
point that a possible cost of urbanization is the associated development of a mass of low 
productivity urban informal sector labour.  
3  Urban economics: empirics 
The previous section outlined the benefits and costs of urbanization. How large are 
these in practise, what is the net balance between them, and how does this vary with city 
size? 
3.1 Productivity 
The main areas of enquiry revolve around the scope, sources, and magnitudes of 
productivity effects (Rosenthal and Strange 2004). For geographical scope, data 
requirements mean that analysis usually takes as given some broadly defined 
metropolitan statistical area. Studies that have focused on geographical scope generally 
find productivity effects operating over quite short geographical distances. For example, 
Patacchini et al. (2006) find that, in the UK, productivity effects operate largely within a 
45-minute driving time. 
With regard to industrial scope, empirical work has usually resorted to a dichotomy 
between two types of externalities: localization and urbanization. Localization 
economies exist if firms benefit from the presence of firms in the same industry. 
Urbanization economies exist if the benefit arises from simply being in large urban 
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areas. Some authors, but not all, define urbanization economies as arising from large 
diverse urban environments. 
Several stylized facts emerge from the developed country literature. There is consistent 
evidence that total factor productivity increases with city size. The survey by Rosenthal 
and Strange (2004: 2133) suggests that ‘doubling city size seems to increase 
productivity by an amount that ranges from 3–8 per cent’. When studies attempt to 
distinguish between urbanization and localization economies, the strength of these 
economies can vary substantially across industries. For example, higher technological 
and service activities appear to benefit from urbanization economies, while more 
standardized production appears to benefit from localization economies. Within the 
standardized production activities, some industries show very strong localization 
externalities, while the effects for other industries are much weaker. Generally, the most 
robust findings concern the existence of localization economies. 
Most of the econometric evidence that is available refers to developed countries but, as 
we have stated, there is nascent literature on productivity effects in developing 
countries. Table 61 presents an overview of the available papers and highlights their 
findings. The econometric literature summarized in Table 61 is still in its infancy. Our 
reading is that, with the exception of two of the studies on India, the findings for 
developing countries are broadly in line with those from developed countries. 
Unfortunately, in the particular case of India, the finding of localization diseconomies in 
some sectors sits uneasily with that of significant spatial concentrations of particular 
industries reported in Lall et al. (2004). Hopefully, further work on the detailed Indian 
data used in Lall et al. (2003, 2004) will throw further light on this matter. Results for 
Brazil, China, Indonesia, and Korea suggest that there is some evidence of urbanization 
economies, but not in all industries. Interestingly, little of the developed or developing 
country literature considers how these externalities change with city size. In fact, nearly 
all specifications are log-linear, which implies constant elasticity of productivity with 
respect to own industry concentration or diversity, so the externalities created per 
worker are basically independent of city size. We also lack good studies in sectors 
outside manufacturing, in particular in services. 
These findings on urbanization and localization appear to be reflected in the pattern of 
economic activity across cities in developing countries. Activities that are subject to 
diversification economies tend to be found in the largest cities. Those that are subject to 
large localization economies are discovered in a few medium-sized cities, while those 
subject to smaller localization economies are less concentrated across a number of small 
size cities. Thus, Lall et al. (2004) find evidence of high spatial concentration for the 
leather and metals sectors, and moderate concentration in food products, textiles, 
mechanical machinery and computing and electronics, while firms in the paper products 
and chemicals sectors do not exhibit patterns of spatial concentration. 
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Table 1: Developing country evidence on productivity effects 
Country Paper  Findings 
Brazil Henderson  (1988)   Localization 
China  Chen (1996)  Localization economies for 2 out of 2 industries 
(machinery and food); does not consider urbanization 
economies  
India Shukla  (1996)  Localization  and  urbanization economies; urbanization 
stronger than localization in 11 out of 13 industries 
  Mitra (2000)  Urbanization economies in 11 out of 17 industries; 
does not consider localization economies. 
 Lall  et al. (2003)  Urbanization: Food processing, textiles, leather, 
paper, chemical, basic metals, mechanical machinery, 
electrical  
Localization diseconomies 
 Lall  et al. (2004)  No localization or urbanization 
Indonesia Henderson  and 
Kuncoro (1996) 
Localization: Apparel (inc. textiles), non-metallic 
minerals, machinery (including transport and 
electrical)  
Urbanization: Wood, furniture, publishing 
Korea  Lee and Zang (1998)   Localization not urbanization economies (19 
industries) 
 Henderson  et al. (2001)  Localization: Traditional, heavy, transport, machinery 
Urbanization: High tech 
 
Evidence on localization is also provided by numerous case studies of spatial clusters of 
firms.
6 This literature makes it clear that the clustering of firms to benefit from some 
sort of agglomeration externalities is a widespread occurrence in developing countries. 
There are often strong market-based input–output linkages between these firms, and 
some evidence that the non-market exchange of goods, information, and people also 
occurs. Many of these case studies also stress the importance of common cultural and 
social background in generating particular norms of behaviour, and of local private and 
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products); Ziwani, Kenya (vehicle repair); Lake Victoria (processed fish); Suame, Ghana (vehicle 
repair and metal work); Western Cape, South Africa (clothing); Tiruppur and Ludhiana, India 
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public institutions that might reinforce those norms. However, identifying the true 
benefits to firms located in these clusters will involve much more analysis, focusing in 
particular on the identification of a set of firms outside the cluster that provide a suitable 
set of controls for comparison (see Humphrey 1995; Schmitz and Nadvi 1999; and 
Visser 1999). 
3.2  Productivity effects in the informal sector 
The evidence on agglomeration effects reported in Table 61 comes exclusively from 
data concerning the ‘formal’ sector. How should the existence of a large pool of 
unemployed/underemployed workers (in accordance with Harris–Todaro) change our 
thinking on agglomeration economies? It might be expected to reduce the benefits of 
city scale, yet there is no evidence that this is the case (see, for example, Au and 
Henderson’s [2006] results for China). There are two possible explanations. One such 
explanation is that the existence of an informal sector drives up urban costs and crowds 
out the formal sector, but not sufficiently quickly to offset the positive productivity 
effects of increasing city size. The second possibility is that the informal sector also 
contributes to agglomeration economies. There is evidence pointing to the existence of 
networks of small firms that benefit considerably from the productivity effects of the 
concentration of employment. In developing countries, authors such as Mukherjee 
(1990) emphasize the vitality of the informal sector. The informal sector often plays an 
important and visible role in the case study literature on clusters in developing 
countries. For example, Chari (2004), in his work on the knitwear cluster in Tiruppur, 
paints a vivid picture of the journey taken by cotton thread through the various milling 
operations, dyeing firms, and fabrication units. Formal and informal sectors play their 
part along the way as independently owned bullock carts shuttle yarn and knitted fabric 
between knitwear companies and fabrication units. To assume that no agglomeration 
externalities exist for Tiruppur’s informal sector, and for informal firms more generally, 
is surely inappropriate. Unfortunately, our reading of the econometric studies is that 
more formal evidence on this issue is simply unavailable. Clearly, this is an important 
area for future work.  
3.3 Costs 
It seems uncontroversial to assert that costs rise with city size, although there is 
surprisingly little systematic developing country evidence on the subject. Evidence from 
Latin America (see Thomas 1980; Henderson 1988) finds that costs of urban living 
increase with city size. Moving from a small urban area to a large urban area at least 
doubles the cost of living. Richardson (1987) finds that the per family marginal 
investment cost is three times larger in urban than in rural areas for four developing 
countries, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan. 
What about the non-economic costs of living in cities? Environmental problems are 
often worse in cities than in rural areas, but it is not clear how these externalities change 
with city size. Glaeser (1998) presents evidence for developed countries that suggests 
that levels of sulphur dioxide and ozone are not related to city size but, rather, that 
particulate concentration increases with city size. Shukla and Parikh (1992) suggest that 
sulphur dioxide has a slight tendency to increase with city size for developing countries. 
They do not consider the impact on ozone levels. Their results for particulates in less-  10
developed countries suggest an inverted-U, first rising and then falling with city size. It 
is very likely that this reflects the absence of industry or income controls (larger cities 
are richer and undertake less manufacturing, concentrating more on services). In 
addition to environmental costs, there are also likely to be a variety of social and health 
costs (and some benefits) associated with urban dwelling; more work is needed to 
integrate these effects in measures of real income in cities. 
3.4 Real  incomes 
Real incomes give the difference between productivity effects and urban costs, and can 
be observed directly. Au and Henderson (2006) use Chinese data to study the 
relationship between real wages and city size. Their results provide several insights that 
have important policy implications. First, there is an inverted-U between real income 
and city size.7 The optimal point on this inverted-U depends on what kind of activity is 
located in the city. Second, the exact level of optimal city size is very imprecisely 
determined. This suggests that policy based on any notion of optimal city size will 
probably face insurmountable difficulties in deciding what that optimal city size 
actually is. Third – at least, from an economic viewpoint – it is much more costly to be 
under-sized than over-sized. This point is so important that it is worth quoting at length: 
‘For [a city with manufacturing to service ratio of 1] from a …peak size of 1.27 million 
if one subtracts 1.22 million people so city size is 50,000, real output per worker falls by 
83 per cent; while, if one adds 1.22 million so size is 2.49 million, it only falls by 26 per 
cent. Real output per worker has a fairly flat portion near the peak, and real output per 
worker initially drops slowly past the peak’ (Au and Henderson 2006: 568). Finally, the 
very flat peak has implications for city sizes when workers are allowed to be mobile. In 
particular, cities with slightly better amenities or market access could end up becoming 
very large compared with cities with slightly worse amenities or market position.  
3.5 Conclusions   
While more research work is needed, it seems clear from the evidence we have that 
there are substantial productivity advantages to urban centres and, as such, the 
development of these centres is a key part of countries’ economic growth. The 
remainder of the paper considers this relationship between city size and productivity, 
and explores some of its implications. 
4  Trade and urban structure 
In this section we explore the determinants of urban systems in a simple analytical 
model. Central to the model is the presence of localization economies creating an 
incentive for specialized cities to form. Pulling in the opposite direction are the costs of 
shipping goods, creating an incentive for production to be dispersed rather than 
concentrated in specialized cities. We use the model to explore the trade-off between 
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these forces. In particular, we investigate the impact of falling trade costs – 
globalization – on urban structures. What impact do we expect falling trade costs to 
have on urban structure, and what world and national urban systems are likely to 
evolve?  
To capture the trade-off between the productivity benefits of urbanization and the cost 
of shipping goods between cities, we make the following assumptions. First, 
localization economies mean that each city is specialized in a particular sector (or a 
clearly defined and linked set of sectors), an approach developed by Henderson (1974). 
Second, countries are small enough that each country has, at most, one city operating in 
a particular sector, (the reader might wish to interpret ‘countries’ as regions or provinces 
in a large country). And third, international trade means that a particular city might 
supply its goods to several countries, and the extent to which this occurs is determined 
from the trade-off between the strength of the localization economies and the costs of 
shipping goods between countries. Details of the model are given in the Appendix and, 
here, we go straight to describing results. 
In Figure 1, the front right-hand axis represents countries. There are ten of them, and in 
the model they are arranged around a circle, with transport costs proportional to the 
(shortest) distance between them around the circle. The left-hand axis represents 
sectors, 20 of them ranked by the degree of returns to scale, those with highest returns at 
the back, and lowest returns at the front, the front three having diminishing returns to 
scale. The vertical axis is the scale of operation of each sector in each city. 
The first panel (top left, t = 3.2) gives the outcome when trade costs are very high (t is 
the trade cost factor for a journey between the two most distant cities). Most city/sectors 
are present in all countries, as illustrated by the large mass of columns of equal height, 
indicating that each country has an equal size city specializing in each of those sectors. 
However, even at these high trade costs a few sectors have sufficiently strong increasing 
returns to concentrate and supply the world from a few locations. To be more exact, 
there are six sectors in which large ‘regional cities’ have formed, supplying the world 
market from either two, three, or four locations. These are the bars at the back of the 
figure. They are tall because the fewer cities there are operating in a sector, the larger 
those cities will be. 
The second panel in the left-hand column gives the situation once trade costs have fallen 
to 2.2. Then, we find the following structure: one sector has concentrated all its 
production into a single world city (with output value = 10). The five sectors with the 
next highest increasing returns are each operating from two cities, each with output 
value  ≈ 5. There are then four sectors operating from three cities, with output   
value ≈ 3, and three sectors, each of which is concentrated in four cities, with output 
value ≈ 2.5. Other sectors operate in all countries. 
Further reductions in trade costs are illustrated in the remaining three panels. As trade 
costs fall, we see that that more sectors come to supply the world from a few global 
hubs, and average city size increases. In the last figure, with perfectly free trade, the 
only sectors that do not operate from a single world city are those in which there are 
diminishing, rather than increasing, returns to scale.   12
Figure 1: City sizes as trade costs fall: city/sectors and countries 
   
Trade costs = 3.2  Trade costs = 1.4 
   
Trade costs = 2.2  Trade costs = 1.0 
 
Trade costs = 1.8   13
 
Several points come out of this analysis. The first is that declining trade costs and 
globalization are forces that will promote the development of large cities. Cities 
specialized in activities with the most increasing returns to scale are the first to become 
regional centres (supplying two or three countries), and then to become world cities. As 
this happens, so cities become larger and – given our assumption that total urban 
population is fixed – there are fewer cities. The second point is the relationship of this 
approach to the extensive literature on the size distribution of cities and, in particular, to 
Zipf’s law (see Fujita et al. 1999). In the example presented here, the size distribution of 
cities depends on openness to trade, and there is a compelling power series logic 
underlying the structure. The largest cities supply the entire world market in the sector; 
the next largest supply half of it; the next largest one third, then one quarter, and so on. 
This does not map directly into the size distribution of cities in any country, as a country 
will not have a presence in all these sectors, but Table 2 reports the estimated coefficient 
on a power law relationship between city size and within-country city rank. We see that 
the city size distribution goes from being much flatter than Zipf’s law (coefficient of -1) 
when trade costs are high, to being steeper when trade costs are low. Of course, these 
numbers are specific to the parameters of the example developed here (considering that 
all sectors take the same share of expenditure) but, as noted, there is a fundamental 
power series logic about the way that trade allows the world to be supplied from integer 
numbers of cities. 
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5  Dynamics: threshold effects and growing an urban structure 
The dynamic in the preceding section comes from falling trade costs. Many developing 
countries also face their own urban dynamic arising from natural population increase 
and internal migration. How is this additional urban population distributed across cities, 
and what does economic analysis have to say about the equilibrium and socially optimal 
pattern of urban development? 
The productivity effects that we described earlier are largely externalities, either 
pecuniary or technological. Such external economies of scale make it hard to start new 
cities. Small cities do not benefit from urban scale economies: they are therefore 
unattractive to firms and to migrants and, as a consequence, fail to grow. Instead, 
migration flows into existing cities, which might grow to become mega-cities, growing 
well beyond their optimum scale and, possibly, to the point where, at the margin, 
diseconomies such as congestion outweigh the positive economies of scale. Such an 
outcome is clearly inefficient, but raises difficult policy issues. There are likely to be   14
two quite distinct types of market failures here. One is that increasing returns to scale 
give rise to externalities, so that the benefits created by a single economic agent (a 
migrant to the city or a relocating firm) are not internalized. The other is that the 
benefits received
8 by a single economic agent accrue over time and might be highly 
uncertain. These two issues require different policy responses: let us deal with the 
second issue first.  
5.1  Expectations of future benefits 
When does it become worthwhile for a single small firm or individual to enter a new or 
secondary level city, rather than an existing established centre? Such entry decisions 
typically require very substantial investment in sunk capital – the physical structures of 
housing, office and factory construction, as well as public infrastructure.
9 The answer 
therefore depends on the confidence that investors have in the future development of the 
city, on their ability to capture the future economic benefits, and on their ability to 
finance investment expenditures. Investors here include both entrepreneurs establishing 
productive activities, and also house-builders meeting residential demand. Clearly, if 
investors do not know which cities are likely to develop, are not able to buy land as a 
way of accessing future capital gains, or cannot borrow to fund their investments, then 
the growth of new urban centres will be postponed, and the growth of mega-cities 
exacerbated. 
These points suggest a fairly clear policy agenda. Government should be aware that 
urban infrastructure investment is of value, both in its own right and as a way of 
signalling to investors that this particular city (as compared with the numerous other 
potential city sites) is one in which there is commitment to growth. There is a need for 
long-term property rights in urban land markets, both to provide security and to give 
investors access to expected future capital gains. Well-functioning long-run credit and 
mortgage markets are also particularly important, given the highly durable nature of 
urban capital stock.  
5.2 Internalizing  externalities 
Adopting these measures increases the incentives to be an early mover from an existing 
mega-city to a new secondary city, but does not remove all market failures. Investors 
are investing in the expectation of receiving the external benefits of a dynamic growing 
city, but they are not capturing the benefits of the externalities that they are themselves 
creating. 
There are two textbook solutions to the problem of internalizing urban externalities. 
One is to internalize effects by creating ‘large developers’, who buy up the land in the 
city, attract firms and immigrants (using subsidies), and then take all the land rents. The 
other is for the public sector to offer Pigovian subsidies for the creation of external 
benefits (and taxes for the dis-benefits of congestion). In practice, neither of these 
                                                 
8  Notice that these are reciprocal externalities, so firms and migrants receive as well as transmit 
benefits. 
9  This section draws on Henderson and Venables (2009).   15
solutions is likely to be satisfactory. Developers play this role in shopping malls and 
office developments, but are unlikely to be large enough to capture more than a fraction 
of the benefits of a city. What, then, is the scope for public intervention through 
subsidy? As we have seen, there are many different channels through which urban 
external economies operate, and there remains great uncertainty about their magnitude. 
It is neither feasible nor desirable to seek to identify and to subsidize every possible 
source of positive externality in production. This is particularly true, since the subsidy 
should depend on the present value of future externalities created by an investment. The 
theory of the second-best warns us to the dangers of piecemeal policy – the possibility 
that when there are multiple distortions correcting some, but not all of them, this does 
not necessarily raise welfare. And notions of targeting city size as a whole are fraught 
with danger. At least conceptually, it should be possible to identify an optimal (or 
efficient) city size. The available evidence suggests that this is extremely unlikely to 
provide a good policy target in practice. This reflects that fact that there are very large 
margins of error associated with attempting to identify optimal city size.  
6 Conclusion 
What do these arguments mean for policy towards the evolving urban structure? There 
are four points: 
•  First, institutional reform is needed to remove the most egregious sources of bias 
towards the primate city. This covers deregulation and measures against 
corruption in order to reduce the attractiveness of the primate city as a source of 
rents. 
•  Second, new and secondary cities can develop only if there are properly 
functioning land and capital markets. Of course, both these arguments are 
important in many contexts, and are simply reinforced by their importance in 
shaping urban structure. 
•  Third, there is coordination failure in developing new centres, and this inevitably 
means that government has to play a strategic role. It is an argument for 
developing infrastructure with a view to facilitating deconcentration, and to 
signalling which cities or regions are likely to grow next. Notice that this is 
‘indicative’, signalling the areas where growth is most likely to occur, not 
dirigiste, seeking to move activity to unprofitable regions. 
•  Finally, having economic agents anticipate the benefits of future city growth is 
probably more important than seeking to internalize the externalities that they 
create. Pigovian subsidies are therefore not an attractive route to follow. The 
practical, informational, political-economic, and fiscal costs of such policies are 
large. Most of the policy gains can, instead, be achieved by shaping 
expectations, by signalling, and by developing land and capital markets.   16
Appendix 
Each city contains a single sector, and we refer to ‘city/sectors’, labelled by subscript i = 
1, 2 ... S. Countries are labelled by j = 1, 2 ... C, so Xij is the output of city/sector i in 
country j. We assume S > C, and that all countries have the same endowments and 
technologies. 
The unit cost of producing good i in country j, cij, is: 
( ), :i X f w c ij j ij =    (1) 
where wj is the wage in country j and the function f is sector specific. The wage rate wj is 
the same for all city/sectors in country j as there is perfect within-country mobility of 
labour and goods. Following Dixit–Stiglitz (1977), there are nij firms (varieties) in 
city/sector i in country j and their equilibrium scale of production is  , x  the same in all 
sectors.
10 Total output is  x n X ij ij ≡  and total production costs in city i country j are  
( ) i X f X w c x n ij ij j ij ij : = .   (2) 
The function f might have increasing returns, f’ < 0, external to the firm but internal to 
the city/sector. 
On the demand side, we use the usual combination of Cobb–Douglas and CES 
preferences. Total income in country j is Yj, and expenditure is divided equally between 
sectors; so, country j expenditure on city/sector i is Yj /S. Within sector, the CES price 
index for varieties of sector i sold in country k from all countries (j) is  
() [ ]
) 1 /( 1 1 σ σ − − ∑ = ijk ij j ij ik t p n G .   (3) 
where tijk are trade costs between countries j and k for goods of sector i and the producer 
price of a unit from country j is pij = cij. The number of varieties adjusts such that 
demand for each variety equals the equilibrium scale of production, so  
() [ ] S Y G t p x k ik ijk k ij / /
1 σ σ − − ∑ ≥   0 ≥ ij n .   (4) 
To close the general equilibrium of the model, we assume a perfectly tradable 
‘agricultural’ sector in each country, taken as the numéraire. The wage equals the 
marginal product of labour, which increases as labour is pulled out of agriculture into 
the urban sectors. Income is the wage bill plus agriculture rent.    
For the numerical example, we set the number of city/sectors at S  = 20, and 
technologies take the form 
( )
i
ij j ij X w c
α
+ = 1    (5) 
                                                 
10 We simply assume that firms operate at this size. The Dixit–Stiglitz model shows how this fixed size 
assumption can be made a consequence of fixed price marginal cost mark-ups.   17
where parameters αi measure the strength of increasing returns to scale and vary across 
industries in the interval [-0.16, 0.007]. The number of countries is C = 10, arranged 
around a circle, with iceberg transport costs between each pair. We simulate the model, 
starting with initial conditions in which tmax = 3.2 (tmax is the trade cost factor between 
the two most distant locations), and there is a small random perturbation of nij from a 
uniform distribution. This produces a non-uniform equilibrium. Trade costs are then 
reduced in small steps, and the new equilibrium found at each step. Further details of 
the programme are available on request. 
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